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Consideration of effective measures to enhance the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives

Report of the Secretary-General*

I. Introduction

1. On 12 December 2000, the General Assembly adopted resolution 55/149, entitled "Consideration of effective measures to enhance the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives". Paragraphs 2 to 13 of the resolution read as follows:

> "*The General Assembly*,
>
> "...
>
> "2. *Strongly condemns* acts of violence against diplomatic and consular missions and representatives, as well as against missions and representatives of international intergovernmental organizations and officials of such organizations, and emphasizes that such acts can never be justified;
>
> "3. *Also strongly condemns* the recent acts of violence against such missions, representatives and officials, referred to in relevant reports under this item;
>
> "4. *Urges* States to strictly observe, implement and enforce the principles and rules of international law governing diplomatic and consular relations and, in particular, to ensure, in conformity with their international obligations, the protection, security and safety of the missions, representatives and officials mentioned in paragraph 2 above officially present in territories under their jurisdiction, including practical measures to prohibit in their territories illegal activities of persons, groups and organizations that encourage, instigate, organize or engage in the perpetration of acts against the security and safety of such missions, representatives and officials;

* The present report contains responses from States as at 15 June 2001, the deadline set in the circular on the subject, dated 17 January 2001.

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"5. *Also urges* States to take all necessary measures at the national and international levels to prevent any acts of violence against the missions, representatives and officials mentioned in paragraph 2 above and to ensure, with the participation of the United Nations, where appropriate, that such acts are fully investigated with a view to bringing offenders to justice;

"6. *Recommends* that States cooperate closely through, inter alia, contacts between the diplomatic and consular missions and the receiving State with regard to practical measures designed to enhance the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives and with regard to the exchange of information on the circumstances of all serious violations thereof;

"7. *Urges* States to take all appropriate measures in accordance with international law, at the national and international levels, to prevent any abuse of diplomatic or consular privileges and immunities, in particular serious abuses, including those involving acts of violence;

"8. *Recommends* that States cooperate closely with the State in whose territory abuses of diplomatic and consular privileges and immunities may have occurred, including by exchanging information and providing assistance to its juridical authorities in order to bring offenders to justice;

"9. *Calls upon* States that have not yet done so to consider becoming parties to the instruments relevant to the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives;

"10. *Also calls upon* States, in cases where a dispute arises in connection with a violation of their international obligations concerning the protection of the missions or the security of the representatives and officials mentioned in paragraph 2 above, to make use of the means for the peaceful settlement of disputes, including the good offices of the Secretary-General, and requests the Secretary-General, when he deems it appropriate, to offer his good offices to the States directly concerned;

"11. *Requests* all States to report to the Secretary-General in accordance with paragraph 9 of resolution 42/154 of 7 December 1987;

"12. *Requests* the Secretary-General to issue a report on the item, in accordance with paragraph 12 of resolution 42/154, containing also an analytical summary of the reports received under paragraph 11 above, on an annual basis, as well as to proceed with his other tasks pursuant to the same resolution;

"13. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-seventh session the item entitled 'Consideration of effective measures to enhance the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives'."

2. By a note dated 17 January 2001, the Secretary-General drew the attention of States to the request contained in paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 55/149 and invited them to report to the Secretary-General serious violations of the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives.

3. The present report is prepared pursuant to paragraph 12 of resolution 55/149.

4. Section II of the report contains a summary of the reports received and the text of those reports.

5. Section III of the present report contains the comments received from States in response to paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 42/154.

6. Section IV of the present report contains information on the status of participation of States, as at 22 May 2001, in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961,[1] the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963[2] and the respective optional protocols thereto, as well as the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents.[3]

II. Reports received from States pursuant to paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 55/149

7. The report by **Georgia**, dated 19 December 2000, was submitted in response to a report submitted by the Russian Federation on 14 September 2000 (A/55/164/Add.2, para. 2), referring to violations involving the Russian Embassy in Tbilisi, its staff and the apartments of several Embassy officials. The relevant part of the report reads as follows:

> Demonstrations and rallies, as well as views expressed in person or group, however critical they may be, ensure fundamental right of expression and freedom of speech in Georgia. The protest gatherings in group, held occasionally in proximity of the Embassy of Russian Federation in Tbilisi since 1997, have to be seen in this context. Neither they, nor views expressed by some political parties protesting threats posed by unaccounted radioactive waste left by the Soviet and then the Russian Army in the territory of Georgia, warranted intervention by the competent authorities. These acts complied with the law of Georgia on assembly and demonstrations, which allows any gathering for expression of views provided this action does not hamper traffic, obstruct access to public objects or block streets.
>
> Because of the incident on 3 July 1999, where the First Secretary of the Embassy was attacked, a criminal investigation is being carried out. As for the other incident of alleged burglary on 14 June 1999, the competent body of the Ministry of Interior had not received any formal complaint or report that could provide legal ground for instituting a criminal case.
>
> The issue of safety and security of diplomatic representations in Tbilisi have been under permanent review of the Government of Georgia. In particular the Special Service of the State Guard reinforced the protection of the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Georgia. The Ministry of Interior of Georgia implemented special measures aimed at providing safety, security and inviolability of diplomatic premises and places of residence of diplomats, as well as maintaining public order in the areas adjacent to these premises. The section of the road leading to the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Tbilisi had been equipped with additional traffic signs. Importantly, the Ministry of Interior of Georgia remains committed to enforcing the law of Georgia on

assembly and demonstrations so as not to allow any gathering and demonstration within 20 meters of diplomatic premises.

Further measures are being sought to improve safety and security of the diplomatic premises in Tbilisi in the course of fully meeting obligations conferred on Georgia by international law.

8. The report by **Turkey** was submitted on 15 January 2001 in response to a report submitted by Greece on 29 June 2000 (A/55/164, para. 11) concerning several incidents where apartments of the employees of the Greek Consulate General in Istanbul and of the Greek Embassy in Ankara were burglarized. The relevant part of the report submitted by Turkey reads as follows:

According to the investigation conducted at the residence of Mrs. Ek. Grabovitis, an employee of the Greek Consulate General in Istanbul, it was determined that an attempt was made to break the locks and to enter the apartment. Nothing has been stolen.

As for the case in relation to the residence of Mr. Gikas, Greek Vice Consul in Istanbul, neither the main door of the apartment nor the windows were forced. No trace or evidence was found and there was no missing item in the apartment. Mr. Gikas did not file any complaint.

According to the investigation conducted at the apartment of Mr. Tselios, an employee of the Greek Embassy in Ankara, it was established that the apartment was broken into, most probably by using a master key. According to Mr. Tselios' statement, a briefcase, a language book and some notebooks were stolen. Despite the search for fingerprints, no trace was found.

As a result of the investigation conducted at the apartment of Mr. Ekonomopoulos, an employee of the Greek Embassy in Ankara, it was seen that the door of his apartment was forced with a hard object, his apartment was broken into. Mr. Ekonomopoulos stated that nothing was missing, and no fingerprints were discovered in the apartment other than those of Mr. Ekonomopoulos.

The investigations of the above-mentioned incidents continue with a view to apprehending the offender(s).

9. **Turkey** also submitted another report, dated 5 February 2001, regarding an incident in Athens. The relevant portion of the report reads as follows:

The private vehicle of Mr. Mehmet Karakaya, who is serving as the counsellor on economic affairs at the Turkish Embassy in Athens, was set on fire on 5 January 2001 at around 9:10 p.m. The car, which had an ordinary license plate for security reasons, was parked at the private garage under the residence of Mr. Karakaya. The fire was extinguished by the local fire department around 10 p.m. Nevertheless, Mr. Karakaya's car, which was parked at a corner on the second floor of the two-floor private garage, was completely burnt.

Having heard of the incident, the staff from the Turkish Embassy immediately went to the venue to examine the scene. It was observed that the other 10 to 15 cars that were parked in the same lot were not damaged.

Therefore, it can be safely said that the said arson attack was deliberately targeted to the Turkish diplomat's vehicle.

This incident constitutes the fifth terrorist act targeting the vehicles of the staff of Turkish Embassy and Turkish Consulate General in Athens/Pireaus since March 1998. It will be recalled that Athens has also been the scene of the assassination of four Turkish diplomats and of attempts on the lives of several others in the past.

10. Yet another report, dated 5 February 2001, submitted by **Turkey** provided information on an incident in Norway. The relevant part of the report reads as follows:

A group of four people has attacked the Turkish Embassy building in Oslo at 2 a.m. on 30 December 2000. The attackers, after getting over the barriers and entering the garden, broke the windows and wrote some slogans in Norwegian onto the front façade of the building with red paint.

They also posted some placards on the outside barriers.

The Police arrived at the scene at 3 a.m. and the investigations were started by the relevant unit at 4 a.m.

11. The report by **Germany**, dated 20 March 2001, was submitted in response to a report submitted by the Russian Federation on 14 September 2000 (A/55/164/Add.2, para. 2), concerning two incidents involving the Russian Embassy in Berlin. The relevant part of the report reads as follows:

Despite all efforts by the police force of the city of Berlin, the offender, who on 6 November 1999 threw a stone into the premises of the Russian Embassy in Berlin, could not be identified. The incident, which did not last for more than a few seconds, was followed by a major search for the offender and criminal investigations by the State Bureau of Criminal Investigations of Berlin. The competent authorities have expressed their regret in a letter addressed to the Russian Embassy in Berlin and have made proposals to increase technical security precautions.

As far as the incident on 31 December 1999 is concerned, a number of measures to avoid a repetition have been discussed with the Russian Embassy in Berlin and have since been implemented by the Berlin Police. The incident, which happened in the midst of the New Year's Eve celebrations (with approximately 100,000 people gathering for a New Year's party around the Brandenburg-Gate located in the immediate vicinity of the Russian Embassy), was the result of a number of misunderstandings and communication problems between security forces as well as the extraordinary circumstances of New Year's Eve festivities. The competent authorities in Berlin have conveyed their apologies to the Russian Embassy in Berlin. All necessary steps have been undertaken to avoid a repetition of the above-mentioned incident and hence of something similar. The competent authorities in Berlin have also discussed with the staff of the Russian Embassy ways to improve the protection of the premises in case of large scale public events in the immediate vicinity.

In both cases no person was hurt. The material damage was extremely limited. Intensive investigations and all necessary steps to avoid similar incidents in future were undertaken by the competent authorities.

12. The report, dated 6 June 2001, submitted by **Turkey** provided information on incidents in Switzerland, Germany, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and France. The relevant part of the report reads as follows:

1. The Turkish flag, hoisted at the flagpole in front of the building that houses the Turkish Permanent Mission to World Trade Organization and Turkish Consulate-General in Geneva, was stolen on 26 March 2001. This is the second such incident following a similar theft of 8-9 August 2000, which occurred at the same location.

2. A bomb was detonated at the entrance of the Turkish Consulate-General in Dusseldorf (Germany) on 17 April 2001 at 3 a.m. The blast seriously damaged the bullet-proof gate of the building and a pit was formed at the spot of the explosion.

3. The office of education attaché in London, which is located outside the Turkish Embassy premises, was occupied by a mob on 20 April 2001. The demonstrators left the office building on the same day.

4. During a demonstration in front of the Turkish Consulate-General in Marseille (France) by a group on 24 April 2001, inflammable substances were thrown to the building, which caused a fire in the garden. It was doused by the staff of the Consulate-General, leaving permanent stains on the pavement. Likewise, the red paint thrown to the building remained on the façade.

13. **Sweden** submitted a report, dated 7 June 2001, referring to a number of incidents in Sweden, several associated with the former Ambassador of Saudi Arabia to Sweden and one with the Embassy of Peru to Sweden. The relevant part of the report reads as follows:

After the arrival of the former Ambassador of Saudi Arabia to Sweden in April 2000 (he has since left) repeated incidents associated with his presence have occurred.

On 19 June 2000, a foreigner of German origin came to the Embassy and said that he had an appointment with the Ambassador. He acted in a suspicious way and was asked to present his identity card. According to the Embassy personnel, the man said that he wanted to transmit a message to King Fahd "to kill the Jews". His identity could later be confirmed by the Police authority.

On 29 September 2000, the Ambassador got a telephone call from a person who left his telephone number. It turned out that the person was mentally ill. However, the same person called again to say that "the Ambassador will soon be killed" and "a bomb will explode".

On 17 February 2001 in the afternoon, two foreigners, a man and a woman, came to the Ambassador's temporary residence in a rental car. The representative of the security company supervising the residence asked what they wanted. They answered that they were looking for a place to live.

The woman seemed nervous and wanted to leave. Both were unwilling to answer the questions and both spoke English with a strong accent.

On 1 March 2001, a letter with no return address arrived at the Embassy "to be delivered to the Ambassador". The letter was opened and the contents turned out to be two pig's ears, its tail and a dagger.

Between 29 and 30 March 2001, an unknown person thrust a knife into the entrance door of the Ambassador's residence and poured red paint on the door and staircase.

Investigations have been made but no perpetrator has been found.

On the occasion of the presidential election in Peru voting facilities had been arranged by the Embassy in a separate building in Stockholm on 8 April between 0800 and 1900 hours. On the arrival of the Embassy personnel in the morning the same day, they found that unknown people had written slogans ("No votar!, Elecciones no, Guerra popular, si!, El partido comunista del Peru, Viva el presidente Gonzalo, PCP") followed by the hammer and sickle with red paint on surface of approximately 10 square meters. Among other things a window-pane was broken.

Because of lack of leads no preliminary investigation was initiated.

14. The report, dated 13 June 2001, submitted by the **Holy See** provided information on incidents in Venezuela, Colombia, France, Honduras and Paraguay. The relevant part of the report reads as follows:

1. On 30 November 1999, a group of unemployed workers furtively occupied the building of the Apostolic Nunciature in Caracas, Venezuela, throughout the day.

2. On 18 December 2000, a group of people, voicing slogans of social nature, occupied the Apostolic Nunciature in Bogotá, Colombia.

3. On 25 December 2000, a number of "*sans papiers*" stole into the Apostolic Nunciature and into the Mission of the Holy See to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization in Paris causing damage to various structures of the building.

4. On 12 March 2001, a thief got into the building of the Apostolic Nunciature in Tegucigalpa, Honduras. The prompt intervention by the police helped in the arrest of the thief.

5. On 16 March 2001, vandalic acts by unknown people damaged a sacred image erected in the garden of the Apostolic Nunciature in Asunción, Paraguay.

15. **Finland** submitted a report, dated 14 June 2001, referring to an incident involving the premises owned by the Embassy of Iraq in Helsinki. Furthermore, the same report in its relevant part provided information in response to a report submitted by the Russian Federation on 14 September 2000 (A/55/164/Add.2, para. 2), concerning the incident involving the Consulate General of the Russian Federation in Turku. The relevant part of the report submitted by Finland reads as follows:

On 1 May 2001, a group of approximately 50 persons broke into the premises owned by the Embassy of Iraq in Helsinki. Some material damage was caused. The premises have been uninhabited for a long period of time. The police are investigating the incident and the Secretary-General will be informed of the result of the investigation in due time.

Further, with reference to the note of 5 February 2001, concerning the incident which took place on 28 May 2000 in the Consulate General of the Russian Federation in Turku, the Permanent Representative of Finland would like to inform His Excellency that the group of people that broke into the premises of the Consulate General were convicted of breach of public peace and given fines by Turku District Court on 11 November 2000. The Finnish authorities wish to assure the Secretary-General that they take very seriously the special duty to take all appropriate action to protect the premises of missions against any intrusion or damage.

16. **Austria**, **Italy** and **Qatar** reported that there had been no violations during the reporting period.

III. Views received from States pursuant to paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 42/154

17. In its report, dated 8 June 2001, **Italy** provided its views as follows:

In this regard, it is pleased to inform that there have been no recent violations of the security of diplomatic and consular offices in Italy apart from sporadic episodes of common crime (particularly theft) reported by foreign diplomatic and consular offices in Italy. These were brought to the attention of the Office of Diplomatic Protocol so that it might intervene with the competent authorities and communicate the results of the investigation. In the view of the competent authorities, the episodes of common crime do not indicate an objective need to step up security at foreign diplomatic and consular offices.

IV. Status of participation in international conventions pertaining to the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives as at 22 May 2001[4]

18. Each instrument listed below is represented by the letter shown on the left in tables 1 and 2 that follow.

A: Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 (signed at Vienna on 18 April 1961; entered into force on 24 April 1964, in accordance with article 51).

B: Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations concerning Acquisition of Nationality of 1961 (signed at Vienna on 18 April 1961; entered into force on 24 April 1964, in accordance with article VI).

C: Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes of 1961 (signed at Vienna on 18 April 1961; entered into force on 24 April 1964).

D: Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963 (signed at Vienna on 24 April 1963; entered into force on 19 March 1967, in accordance with article 77).

E: Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations concerning Acquisition of Nationality of 1963 (signed at Vienna on 24 April 1963; entered into force on 19 March 1967).

F: Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes of 1963 (signed at Vienna on 24 April 1963; entered into force on 19 March 1967).

G: Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, of 1973 (adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 14 December 1973; entered into force on 20 February 1977).

Notes

[1] United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 500, No. 7310, p. 95.

[2] Ibid., vol. 596, No. 8638, p. 261.

[3] General Assembly resolution 3166 (XXVIII), annex.

[4] For detailed information, see the Internet address http://untreaty.un.org.

Table 1

Total participation in international conventions pertaining to the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives

Signature, succession to signature						
A	*B*	*C*	*D*	*E*	*F*	*G*
60	18	29	48	18	38	25

Ratification, accession or succession						
A	*B*	*C*	*D*	*E*	*F*	*G*
180	49	62	165	38	45	107

Table 2

Status of participation in international conventions pertaining to the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives

	Signature, succession to signature							*Ratification, accession or succession*						
State	*A*	*B*	*C*	*D*	*E*	*F*	*G*	*A*	*B*	*C*	*D*	*E*	*F*	*G*
Afghanistan								A						
Albania	A							A			D			
Algeria								A			D			G
Andorra								A			D			
Angola								A			D			
Antigua and Barbuda											D			G
Argentina	A	B		D		F		A	B		D			G
Armenia								A			D			G
Australia	A			D			G	A		C	D		F	G
Austria	A		C	D		F		A		C	D		F	G
Azerbaijan								A			D			G
Bahamas								A		C	D			G
Bahrain								A			D			
Bangladesh								A			D			
Barbados								A			D			G
Belarus	A						G	A			D			G
Belgium	A		C	D		F		A	B	C	D	E	F	
Belize								A			D			
Benin				D		F		A			D			
Bhutan								A			D			G
Bolivia				D				A			D			
Bosnia and Herzegovina					E	F		A	B	C	D			G
Botswana								A	B	C				G
Brazil	A			D	E			A			D			G
Brunei Darussalam														G
Bulgaria	A						G	A		C	D	E	F	G
Burkina Faso				D		F		A			D		F	
Burundi								A						G
Cambodia								A	B	C				
Cameroon				D	E	F		A			D			G
Canada	A						G	A			D			G
Cape Verde								A			D			
Central African Republic	A	B	C	D		F		A	B	C				
Chad								A						
Chile	A			D		F		A			D			G

State	Signature, succession to signature							Ratification, accession or succession						
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
China								A			D			G
Colombia	A		C	D	E	F		A			D			G
Comoros														
Congo				D	E	F		A						
Cook Islands														
Costa Rica	A			D				A		C	D			G
Côte d'Ivoire				D		F		A						
Croatia								A			D			G
Cuba	A			D				A			D			G
Cyprus								A			D			G
Czech Republic								A			D			G
Democratic People's Republic of Korea								A			D			G
Democratic Republic of the Congo	A			D	E	F		A	B	C	D			G
Denmark	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Djibouti								A			D			
Dominica								A			D			
Dominican Republic	A	B	C	D	E	F		A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Ecuador	A		C	D			G	A		C	D			G
Egypt								A	B		D	E		G
El Salvador								A			D			G
Equatorial Guinea								A			D			
Eritrea								A			D			
Estonia								A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Ethiopia								A						
Fiji								A		C	D			
Finland	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
France	A		C	D		F		A		C	D		F	
Gabon				D		F		A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Gambia														
Georgia								A			D			
Germany	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Ghana	A	B	C	D	E	F		A			D	E		G
Greece	A							A			D			G
Grenada								A			D			
Guatemala	A						G	A			D			G
Guinea								A	B	C	D			
Guinea-Bissau								A						
Guyana								A			D			

State	Signature, succession to signature							Ratification, accession or succession						
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Haiti								A			D			G
Holy See	A			D				A			D			
Honduras								A			D			
Hungary	A						G	A		C	D		F	G
Iceland							G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
India								A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Indonesia								A	B		D	E		
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	A	B	C	D				A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Iraq	A	B	C					A	B	C	D	E		G
Ireland	A		C	D		F		A			D			
Israel	A		C	D				A						G
Italy	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Jamaica								A			D			G
Japan	A		C					A		C	D		F	G
Jordan								A			D			G
Kazakhstan								A			D			G
Kenya								A	B	C	D	E	F	
Kiribati								A			D			
Kuwait				D	E	F		A		C	D			G
Kyrgyzstan								A			D			
Lao People's Democratic Republic								A	B	C	D	E	F	
Latvia								A			D			G
Lebanon	A	B	C	D		F		A			D			G
Lesotho								A			D			
Liberia	A			D	E	F		A			D			G
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya								A	B		D			G
Liechtenstein	A		C	D		F		A		C	D		F	G
Lithuania								A			D			
Luxembourg	A		C	D		F		A		C	D		F	
Madagascar								A	B	C	D	E	F	
Malawi								A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Malaysia								A	B	C	D			
Maldives											D			G
Mali								A			D			
Malta								A		C	D			
Marshall Islands								A			D			
Mauritania								A			D			G
Mauritius								A		C	D		F	

State	Signature, succession to signature							Ratification, accession or succession						
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Mexico	A			D				A			D			G
Micronesia (Federated States of)								A			D			
Monaco														
Mongolia							G	A			D			G
Morocco								A	B		D	E		
Mozambique								A			D			
Myanmar								A	B		D			
Namibia								A			D			
Nauru								A						
Nepal								A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Netherlands								A	B	C	D	E	F	G
New Zealand	A		C					A		C	D		F	G
Nicaragua							G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Niger				D		F		A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Nigeria	A							A			D			
Niue														
Norway	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Oman								A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Pakistan	A							A		C	D		F	G
Palau														
Panama	A			D	E	F		A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Papua New Guinea								A			D			
Paraguay							G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Peru				D		F		A			D			G
Philippines	A	B	C	D		F		A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Poland	A			D			G	A			D			G
Portugal								A			D			G
Qatar								A			D			G
Republic of Korea	A	B	C					A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Republic of Moldova								A			D			G
Romania	A						G	A			D			G
Russian Federation	A						G	A			D			G
Rwanda							G	A			D			G
Saint Kitts and Nevis														
Saint Lucia								A			D			
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines								A			D			G
Samoa								A			D			
San Marino	A							A						

State	Signature, succession to signature							Ratification, accession or succession						
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Sao Tome and Principe								A			D			
Saudi Arabia								A			D			
Senegal	A	B						A			D	E	F	
Seychelles								A		C	D		F	G
Sierra Leone								A						
Singapore														
Slovakia								A		C	D		F	G
Slovenia								A		C	D			G
Solomon Islands														
Somalia								A			D			
South Africa	A							A			D			
Spain								A			D			G
Sri Lanka	A							A	B	C				G
Sudan								A			D			G
Suriname								A	B	C	D	E	F	
Swaziland								A						
Sweden	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Switzerland	A		C	D		F		A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Syrian Arab Republic								A	B		D	E		G
Tajikistan								A			D			
Thailand	A	B						A	B		D	E		
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia								A	B	C	D			G
Togo								A			D			G
Tonga								A			D			
Trinidad and Tobago								A			D			G
Tunisia							G	A	B		D	E		G
Turkey								A			D			G
Turkmenistan								A			D			G
Tuvalu								A			D			
Uganda								A						
Ukraine	A						G	A			D			G
United Arab Emirates								A			D			
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	A		C	D		F	G	A		C	D		F	G
United Republic of Tanzania	A	B	C					A	B	C	D			
United States of America	A		C	D		F	G	A		C	D		F	G
Uruguay	A			D		F		A			D			G

State	Signature, succession to signature							Ratification, accession or succession						
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
Uzbekistan								A			D			G
Vanuatu											D			
Venezuela	A			D				A			D			
Viet Nam								A			D			
Yemen								A			D			G
Yugoslavia					E	F		A	B	C	D			G
Zambia								A						
Zimbabwe								A			D			